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Peacebuilding aims at creating structures and capabilities within the affected society
which will avoid the relapse into armed conflict. Since the end of the Cold War, democratization
has been chosen as the standard strategy of peacebuilding.1 Democracy provides an alternative to
armed conflict. Governments can be removed without bloodshed, and other political intra-state
disputes may be settled or solved non-violently as well.2 Democracy deserves a prominent place
in theories of civil peace. Nevertheless, some dangers for civil peace and the democratic order
itself have roots in the elements of democracy. Democratic liberties can just as well be (ab)used
by anti-democrats as by extremists, and thus democratic systems bear the risk of their own over-
throw. A second danger results from the political contestation that characterizes democracy.
Competition offers incentives for candidates and political parties to inflame hatred and fear in
order to win the support of as many people as possible. A third peril is the use of majority rule to
exclude whole conflict parties from political decision-making or to ignore their needs and inter-
ests completely. Under the specific conditions of post-war societies the destructive potential of
democracy and democratization is more easily activated. That is due to the fact that war has
pushed back democratic attitudes and actors, while extremist and criminal actors have risen into
high social and political positions. Compared to well-established democracies, it is less likely
that democratic rules will be obeyed. Conflict parties abide less by democratic norms and dis-
trust each other more than in consolidated democracies. Democratic contestation means “orga-
nized uncertainty” (Adam Przeworski).3 In post-war societies, however, there is so much at stake
that uncertainty seems to be more threatening than in established and consolidated democracies.
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Those institutions whose purpose is to guarantee democratic contestation and the security of the
conflict parties are regarded as unreliable and are subject to the greatest challenges.
After case studies on creating democracies in eleven post-civil war societies, Roland
Paris did not reject the objective of democracy-building. Instead, he proposed the concept of
“institutionalization before liberalization,” which is supposed to contain the dangers of democra-
tization after civil strife. This approach consists of the following recommendations:
1. elections only under ripe conditions;
2. creating effective institutions by international administration;
3. establishing an election system that makes moderation pay;
4. banning radical political parties and organizations;
5. support for moderate political parties and civil society organizations;
6. control of hate speech.4
While post-conflict elections,5 power-sharing provisions,6 or security guarantees by
external actors7 have attracted much attention, the research on post-civil societies has neglected
the new concept of “institutionalization before liberalization.” My paper demonstrates that the
efforts of peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina came rather close to this approach without
trying to implement all its recommendations. This paper serves to assess the results produced by
these attempts at peace- and democracy-building. At first, however, I give a brief overview over
the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Dayton Peace Agreement.
1. The war in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the peace agreement of Dayton
Before the war, fewer than 4.5 million people lived in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Most of the
Muslims or Bosniacs (44% of the population) and the Croats (17%) wanted to secede from
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Yugoslavia. Most of the Serbs (31%), however, opposed this desire for independence. After
Bosnia-Herzegovina had won international recognition as a sovereign state under the name
“Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina” in spring 1992, radical Serbs and later also radical Croats
fought for secession from the new state.8 The war lasted three and a half years, 100,000 people
were killed,9 and every second citizen became a refugee or displaced person.
After the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herze-
govina, known as the Dayton Agreement,10 in December 1995, many thousands of peace-
builders invaded the country and set up a giant laboratory for social engineering. The Office of
the High Representative (OHR) had the task of coordinating the efforts to implement the civilian
parts of the Dayton Agreement. An OSCE mission had to organize elections. One of the most
striking findings of research on civil wars is that a credible security guaranty by external actors
drastically reduces the probability of a relapse into civil strife. It was a lesson learned and imple-
mented in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where multinational peacekeeping forces credibly guaran-
teed security to all parties to the conflict. In December 1995, the Implementation Force (IFOR)
of about 60,000 troops started its mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the end of 2005, about
6,000 soldiers of the European Union Force (EUFOR) kept the peace.11 In the following, I use
the short but not very precise term “peace mission.” In fact, many state agencies, international
organizations, and non-governmental associations with different and even contradicting
approaches took part in consolidating the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.12
413 Gromes 2004b.
14 On consociational democracy: Lijphart 1977; Lijphart 1990; Lijphart 1999; Lijphart 2004;
Lustick 1979.
15 On Srebrenica: Bogoeva and Fetscher 2002; Honig and Both 1996; Rohde 1997; Sudetic 1998.
The more a democracy is based on the principle of “winner takes all,” the more it is like-
ly that one of the former warring parties will monopolize political power, thereby winning in
peace time what it could not achieve during the war. Its enemy, in contrast, loses the war belat-
edly. This would be particularly dangerous when demobilization is slow or nonexistent. Espe-
cially in societies torn apart along ethnic lines, a majoritarian democracy probably sets a society
on a short track back to civil war.13 Wisely, the Dayton Agreement did not demand the creation
of a majoritarian democracy. Instead, it prescribed a new political system, one that should large-
ly fulfill the criteria of a consociational democracy.14 This type of democracy is characterized by
four elements:
1. a shared executive of all major conflict parties in the institutions at the higher level of
the political system;
2. veto right for all groups in these bodies;
3. proportionality;
4. autonomy of parties to the conflict, which may include federalism.
According to the peace accords, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the official name since then,
remained a single state but consisted of two entities: The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
covering 51% of the territory, and Republika Srpska (Serb Republic) on the remaining 49%.
Republika Srpska includes the former safe area of Srebrenica, where Serb forces in July 1995
committed the worst war crime in Europe since World War II, killing almost 8,000 Bosniac boys
and men.15 The common state institutions, called “institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” pos-
sessed competencies only for foreign policy, foreign trade, customs, monetary policy, emigra-
tion, countrywide traffic, and communication, whereas the two entities of the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska had to be regarded as real power centers. While
Republika Srpska was a centralized entity, the Federation was once again a consociational
516 For two of these cantons (Herzegovina-Neretva and Central Bosnia) the constitution of the
Federation prescribes further power-sharing provisions.
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are in minority in that half. In RS (Republika Srpska, ThG) Serbs are dominant people, in Feder-
ation Bosniacs are dominant people. There is no way to find Croats to have some balance to
Serbs or Bosniacs,” said Josip Merdžo (HDZ), deputy speaker of the state level House of Repre-
sentatives: Interview, Mostar, 18 April 2005. I report only the position or function the inter-
viewee held at the time of the interview.
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democracy divided into ten cantons.16 However, the federal setup with two entities for three
ethnic groups was asymmetric. Despite all power-sharing provisions in the Federation, the
Croats complained of being discriminated against by the constitution and menaced by the
Bosniac majority.17
The Dayton constitution guaranteed the representation of all three major ethnic groups in
the tripartite state presidency and indirectly in both chambers of the state parliament, as well as
in the state government. It institutionalized the ethnic conflict and discriminated against those
who did not want to declare themselves as Bosniac, Serb, or Croat. For the three seats in the state
presidency, for instance, only Bosniacs, Serbs, and Croats could run.
More than proportionality of ethnic groups, proportionality of the entities was demanded.
An ethnic veto was anchored within the state presidency; it was more powerful, however, within
the House of Peoples, one of the two chambers of the state parliament. This veto was not limited
to certain areas but could be used by any one of the three “constitutive peoples” when it per-
ceived its vital interests as endangered.
2. Early elections and the illusion of an instant democracy
“Institutionalization before liberalization” includes postponing elections until ripe condi-
tions are given; that means until passions have cooled down and reliable opinion polls show that
peace-oriented parties possess sufficient support.18 Roland Paris derived this recommendation
from Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the lesson to avoid early elections was not implemented.
Elections and election campaigning can serve as catalysts for tensions. Ballots may lead back to
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bullets. In Bosnia and Herzegovina elections of the state and entity parliaments and presidencies
took place in September 1996, only nine months after the signing of the Dayton agreement.
However, the case under study also demonstrates that the lesson not to hold early elec-
tions might be too simple. What would it have meant for Bosnia and Herzegovina to postpone
the elections? Even after the peace agreement, the country actually consisted of three statelets or
“warrior states” as Carl Bildt, the first High Representative (December 1995–June 1997) called
them.19 The ethno-nationalist Serb Democratic Party (SDS) possessed a near-monopoly of power
in Republika Srpska, their warrior state recognized in Dayton as an entity of Bosnia and Herze-
govina. The ethno-nationalist Croat Democratic Community (HDZ) had an even tighter grip on
its warrior state, “Herceg Bosna.” Finally, the ethno-nationalist Bosniac Party of Democratic
Action (SDA) dominated the institutions of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina which were
boycotted by Serb and Croat ethno-nationalists. There were some differences in these three
regimes, since the largest degree of pluralism was tolerated in areas dominated by the SDA.
What the statelets had in common, however, was that the respective ruling ethno-nationalist
party in each warrior state controlled almost all spheres of society: the armed forces, militias,
police, secret services, courts, the most important media, the distribution of humanitarian aid and
flats, and the economy, including the payment system (through “payment bureaus”) and the
black market.20
After the peace agreement, neither were the common state institutions created at once,
nor did interim governments come to power. Thus, to postpone the elections would have meant
to delay establishing the Dayton institutions that should keep the country together. Moreover, it
would have resulted in continuing the autocratic rule of three parties in three ethnic statelets.
This was one reason why the peace mission and opposition parties were in favor of early elec-
tions, whereas the ruling parties showed less interest in them.21
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23 Stedman 1997.
Another reason for early elections after Dayton was that the peace mission propagated
the illusion of an instant democracy that would allow them to leave the country within twelve
months. The peacekeeping force and other parts of the peace mission had a mandate for one year
only. With the presidential election ahead, Bill Clinton promised that the boys would be back
home very soon and would not engage in long-term nation-building.22 Consequently, the citizens
of Bosnia and Herzegovina went to the polling stations assuming that the peace mission would
leave some weeks later. They voted in great uncertainty about the near future. By their arbitrary
time-frame of one year, the peacebuilders bolstered the campaign claims of the ethno-nationalist
parties that their respective ethnic groups faced a great danger. Furthermore, the peace mission
demonstrated that it was not very interested in whether the Dayton institutions would be set up
and become functioning. Radical groups and “spoilers”23 who wanted to stop the peace process
received the message that they had only to wait for the peacebuilders to leave. The time-frame of
twelve months provided an incentive to maintain the exclusive and separate political structures
of the three ethnically-defined warrior states. It ensured that after the elections the newly estab-
lished democratic institutions of the Dayton agreement would not matter.
The ethno-nationalist parties that were responsible for the war won the elections and did
not dissolve the illegal structures of their ethnic statelets. The Serb and Croat ethno-nationalists
did not abandon their agenda of secession and they continued to obstruct the common democrat-
ic institutions at the various levels. As the first anniversary of the Dayton agreement came closer,
the peace mission recognized that it had succeeded in keeping the cease-fire and in organizing
elections, but had failed to get common democratic institutions functioning. It decided to stay
longer, but again set another timeline of twelve months. A further year had to pass before the
peacebuilders declared that they would leave only when they were sure that a self-sustainable
peace existed.
824 Paris 2004, pp. 205–07.
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3. International administration through a semi-protectorate
In order to re-structure the party system, to create ripe conditions for elections, or to con-
trol hate speech, strong and effective institutions are needed. Roland Paris favors international
administration that will (re-)build institutions and prepare them for a transfer of power to the
local actors.24 The Dayton Agreement prescribed that the peace mission take part in and even
dominate some Dayton institutions: the head of the OSCE mission held the key position in the
Provisional Election Commission; three of seven judges at the Constitutional Court were for-
eigners, and the Central Bank was run by an expert from abroad. Despite this influence, only
small progress could be achieved in the first year of peacebuilding. Reacting to this, the peace
mission hoped that conditionality of aid would overcome the resistance against the return of
refugees and displaced persons and against the common democratic institutions according to the
Dayton agreement.
At the end of 1997, however, looking back at two years of obstructionism, the Peace
Implementation Council, an ad hoc body of states and international organizations interested in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, expanded the mandate of the High Representative. He was given the
competency to remove elected politicians and other officials who in his view had obstructed the
implementation of the peace agreement. Additionally, he was allowed to make binding decisions
and to impose legislation.25 These competencies were called Bonn Powers because the confer-
ence introducing them took place in the former German capital. Since December 1997, the
Office of the High Representative has served not only as guarantor of the Dayton constitution,
but also as a second center of legislative and executive rights. Elected parliaments and govern-
ments still exist; their decisions, however, can be overruled by the High Representative. Between
December 1997 and the end of 2005, the High Representative dismissed 190 politicians and
other officials; in total he made 750 decisions using his Bonn Powers.26 Looking at this interven-
927 In a full protectorate, the peace mission takes over the state institutions and is the sole center
of executive and legislative competencies.
28 Chandler 2000.
29 UN Secretary-General, 5 June 2002, para. 4.
30 During this certification process, however, much corruption occurred: interview with
Aleksandra Babić, National Political Officer EUPM SBS, Banja Luka, 14 April 2005; interview
with Dragan Jerinić, chief editor of the daily Nezavisne Novine, Banja Luka 14 April 2005. On
police reform: Bonvin 2003; Collantes Celador 2005; Human Rights Watch 1998; International
Crisis Group, 10 May 2002; Stodiek 2003, pp. 159–257.
31 Independent Judicial Commission 2004, pp. 54–59; Schwarz 2003.
tion, Bosnia and Herzegovina has to be qualified as a semi-protectorate,27 a sub-type of interna-
tional administration.
The most cited study on the democratization efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina is David
Chandler’s “Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton.”28 It argues that Bosnia and Herzegovina
is not a democracy, since major decisions are not made by the elected representatives but by for-
eign protectors. However, Chandler completely misses the point that through the undemocratic
means of these protectors Bosnia and Herzegovina has become more democratic. By its sweep-
ing powers, the peace mission made the common democratic institutions of the Dayton institu-
tions more important. The OHR, in cooperation with the peacekeeping forces, has gradually
undermined the illegal institutions of Herceg Bosna and the undemocratic power structures of
the ethno-nationalist parties.
The peace mission has intervened in almost every sector of society. Already in the sec-
ond year it started to loosen the ethno-nationalist parties’ grip on the electronic media. Later,
through the Bonn Powers, the High Representative imposed a public broadcasting system. After
1997, the peace mission expanded its efforts to reform the local police. The oversized police
forces, a means of patronage, were reduced from 44,000 in 1996 to 17,000 in 2002.29 All police
officers were vetted for their wartime past and their human rights record after the peace agree-
ment.30 Moreover, the OHR established councils that tendered all jobs for judges and prosecutors
and assessed the candidates’ qualification and wartime past.31 The peacekeeping forces disman-
tled gangs or militias that served the ruling parties and attacked or intimidated opposition parties
10
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or ethnic minorities. Agencies for civil service were established in order to restrain the political
parties’ resources for patronage.32
The economic power base of the ethno-nationalist parties, however, was not addressed
systematically. Although the OHR announced a priority of establishing the rule of law, it is quite
easy to see that war profiteers and other criminals have not lost illegally acquired property. The
peace mission, however, dissolved the system of payment bureaus through which the ethno-
nationalist parties had the possibility to control money flows in order to support their cronies and
to finance parallel structures.33 It introduced a new common currency, the Convertible Mark
(KM), which united regions separated by three different currencies. Moreover, it established a
State Border Service to reduce smuggling, which had been an important source of income for the
Serb and Croat ethno-nationalists.
Of course, not every measure achieved the goals set by the peace mission. Police reform,
for instance, even in 2006 is still an issue at the top of the agenda. Peacebuilders as well as
analysts still do not perceive the police as independent from illegal political influence.34 The
crucial point, however, is that illegal and parallel structures of governance and power were
destroyed completely or drastically reduced in their meaning. Without the Bonn Powers to dis-
miss officials and to impose legislation these illegal power structures would be much stronger
than they are today. As the ethno-nationalist parties lost their anti-constitutional structures, the
Dayton institutions gained relevance.
Changes in Croatia and Serbia also strengthened the Dayton institutions. Croatia’s presi-
dent, Franjo Tuđman, against whom the International Tribunal in The Hague had prepared an
indictment, died at the end of 1999. Some weeks later, his party lost power and was replaced by
a coalition led by the Social Democrats. The new government underlined that the Croats in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina should not strive for secession. When the Tuđman party returned to power,
it had already chosen a more moderate program. Due to these developments the Croats in Bosnia
and Herzegovina have had to accept that there is only a small chance to secede from this coun-
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2005).
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try. The same effect, but on a smaller scale, was caused by the overthrow of the Milošević
regime in Serbia in October 2000. The new governments decided to moderate their positions
toward their neighbor; nevertheless Zoran Đinđić and even more Vojislav Koštunica sometimes
questioned the integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Another important factor for strengthening the Dayton institutions was the shared desire
of Bosniacs, Serbs, and Croats to join the European Union. According to opinion polls in 2004
and 2005, 85% would vote Yes in a referendum for EU membership.35 The political leaders of
the three peoples have learned that there is no way to achieve European association and integra-
tion outside the common state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
As the ethno-nationalists realized that chances for alternative solutions to Dayton were
becoming less and less likely, their willingness to work in the institutions established according
to the peace agreement increased. Both the ethno-nationalist themselves and their rivals say that
SDS and HDZ accepted the common state more than ten or thirteen years ago. “It is rather obvi-
ous that SDS and HDZ now include the reality into their programs. They feel that Bosnia and
Herzegovina is a fact,” said Beriz Belkić (SBiH), a former member of the state presidency.36
Mirsad Ćeman stated: “I am a member of the SDA and have to say that HDZ, SDS, and the other
Serb parties increasingly consider Bosnia and Herzegovina as their country.”37 Josip Merdžo
(HDZ) stressed: “Is it not a question for us whether this is as state or whether it should be disas-
sembled.”38 While Borislav Bojić (SDS) said that his party builds on Bosnia and Herzegovina,39
Igor Radojičić [Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD)] underlined: “You will not
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find any serious party, if any party at all, that is supporting now the idea of dissolving the coun-
try.”40
In 2005/2006, the main political conflict was still over the question how the state of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina should be organized. In this regard there is no change from 1996 or 1997.
Then, however, the conflict parties fought for their interests predominantly outside the Dayton
institutions. Nowadays, they deal with this conflict first and foremost within the institutions
established by the peace agreement.
3.1 Limits of the semi-protectorate in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Drawing conclusions from their experience, High Representative Paddy Ashdown and
Michael Steiner, a deputy of one of Ashdown’s predecessors, favored a “front-loaded ap-
proach.”41 Ashdown argued “that it is vital to go in with the authority you need from the start.”42
In their view, the High Representative should have possessed the power to impose laws and to
remove politicians already in 1996. This point, however, is problematic. It seems rather unlikely
that in Dayton the parties to the conflict would have accepted in addition to other concessions to
cede power to the benefit of a semi-protectorate. Thus, a semi-protectorate is available only in
rare cases at the start of a peace mission.
The international agencies were present not only in Sarajevo, Banja Luka, the capital of
Republika Srpska, or Mostar, the center of Herzegovina. The OHR and the OSCE mission pos-
sessed several field offices throughout the country. Perhaps they knew what was going on in the
parliaments and governments at the state and entity level. The protectors, however, could not
observe the situation in all towns and villages. Even if their staff were double or triple, the peace
missions to Bosnia and Herzegovina would still have been troubled by a lack of knowledge. A
member of the state presidency has always been decided under the eyes of the peace mission in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Notorious hot spots and strongholds of hard-liners have also attracted
observation. Therefore, many sanctions affected politicians on the highest level and locations as
13
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president of her party.
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Mostar, Stolac, or Doboj. However, radical or criminal officials at the local level who keep a low
profile are likely to succeed in avoiding attention and punishment.43 I spent more than three
weeks in the city of Zavidovići in Zenica-Doboj-Canton. Many stories about war profiteers,
ethno-nationalist power structures or obstructionism could be told. The responsible field office
of the OHR is in Tuzla, about 70 km from Zavidovići, and the office of the OSCE mission is in
Zenica, a distance of one hour. A lack of information was unavoidable for the peace mission, and
this deficit inevitably led to the perception that the peacebuilders acted inconsistently and even
arbitrarily. This impression furthered the suspicion that the protectors did not take the principles
of democracy seriously, but tried to put through other interests.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the locals knew the society they lived in much better than the
peacebuilders from abroad. The Bosnians and Herzegovinians possessed better connections and
more expanded networks. The fact that many peacebuilders signed contracts for a six months
period or even less worsened this problem. When the Bosnian and Herzegovinian actors were
nevertheless threatened by sanctions, they could retreat to the lower levels of politics or other
sectors of society, such as to the economic sphere, where it was much more difficult to track
their activities.44
Because of the semi-protectorate, politicians regarded changes for the better of their
rivals’ behavior as mere reaction to possible sanctions by the peace mission, but not as indicator
of altered attitudes. “On the surface the leaders of the nationalist parties have changed. They
would not say today some stupid things they said before. I do not know how much is real,”
Lamija Tanović [Liberal Democratic Party (LDS)] said.45 Milorad Živković (SNSD), member of
the state level House of Representatives, stated on the SDS: “I believe, if there was no pressure
by the international actors, they likely would present radical rightists positions and go back to
those positions they had in 1991.”46 The semi-protectorate contributed to maintaining distrust
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between the parties to the conflict. The peace mission as well wondered how much it could trust
the claims by the ethno-nationalist parties to have transformed themselves.
Due to its geographical position, Bosnia and Herzegovina was a privileged case where
many peacebuilders worked and a great amount of money was spent in order to consolidate
peace. Marina Ottaway calculated that one would need 900,000 peace forces and civilian staff in
the Democratic Republic of Congo to reach the relative size of the peace mission in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.47 Taken the currently given limited willingness for peacebuilding, a peace mission
such as the one in Bosnia and Herzegovina is too expensive to be a model for all other post-civil
war societies.
3.2 The Bonn Powers as an obstacle to democratization
I have argued that the sweeping powers of the High Representative were necessary to
attack parallel institutions and undemocratic power structures and to create conditions in which
the Dayton institutions would matter more. However, the OHR competency to sack officials and
to impose decisions also weakened the role of the Dayton institutions. The peace mission saw
this problem and frequently argued that the local politicians had to take over responsibility. The
mantra of High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch (August 1999–May 2002) was to establish
ownership.48 His successor, Paddy Ashdown (May 2002–January 2006), repeatedly stated his
regrets that he had to make use of his powers.
Local politicians perceived a strong incentive not to make unpopular decisions for them-
selves but to wait until the High Representative imposed a law or measure.49 While the protector
was criticized, the local politicians did not have to explain choices to their electorate but could
stick to a comfortable position. The competency to remove officials could not always compen-
sate for this unintended side effect of the Bonn Powers.
“International community created passivity here, a very passive atmosphere. You will
find very passive politicians, governments without visions, leaders without visions and pro-
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grams. Everybody of them is sitting and waiting for programs, ideas, laws, constitutional
changes written by the international community. They are destroying one of the most important
things for Bosnia—to train or to force politicians to find consensus,” Igor Radojičić (SNSD)
said.50 Passivity, however, was not limited to the politicians. Citizens waited as well for the OHR
instead of organizing themselves.
Owing to the consociational character of the Dayton constitution the functioning of the
political system was extremely dependent on compromises. Local politicians, however, frequent-
ly tried to avoid compromise because they believed a decision by High Representative would
match their interests more than an agreement with the political rival.
The peace mission tried to democratize Bosnia and Herzegovina by undemocratic means.
The citizens in Sarajevo and elsewhere were supposed to learn that political decisions should be
made according to democratic principles. However, they neither chose the High Representative
from several candidates nor held him accountable by their ballots. Political power should be
limited and controlled by an elected opposition and the separation of powers. But there was no
opposition or independent judiciary limiting the power of the High Representative. Everyone
should abide by the law; the “benevolent despots” of the OHR,51 however, in fact stood above
the law. An annex of the Dayton Agreement defined their mandate, but the final authority to
interpret this text was vested in the OHR itself. Regarding dismissals, the Office of the High
Representative was both prosecutor and judge. The Bosnians and Herzegovinians were taught
the unintended lesson that in politics the crucial question was not whether a decision was made
democratically, but who was in possession of the more far-reaching power. “The argument of
power is stronger than the power of arguments,” Dragan Mikerević (PDP), former Prime Min-
ister of Republika Srpska, complained.52 The semi-protectorate confirmed the predominant
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authoritarian beliefs and orientation, and prevented the development of a democratic political
culture.53
4. The fight against ethno-nationalist parties
The concept “institutionalization before liberalization” recommends banning radical par-
ties. In fact, opposition parties, the International Crisis Group, and Richard Holbrooke, principal
mediator in Dayton, frequently demanded that the ethno-nationalist Serb Democratic Party
(SDS) or the Croat Democratic Community (HDZ) be prohibited. Since these parties represented
a large majority of their respective people, their ban would have come close to excluding two of
the three conflict parties. A smart concept of conflict resolution looks different.
The peace mission did not prohibit either the SDS, the HDZ, or the Bosniac SDA. How-
ever, from December 1997 at the latest onward, the various parts of the peace mission more and
more agreed to weaken the ethno-nationalist parties. As described above, the peace mission tried
to bring down their illegal power structures. Moreover, the ruling ethno-nationalist parties were
subject to visa restrictions, fees, and other financial sanctions. The High Representative removed
many of their representatives from elected offices, among them even members of the state presi-
dency. Dismissals also affected the distribution of positions within a political party. These
attacks concentrated on the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) and the Croat Democratic Community
(HDZ). The Party of Democratic Action (SDA) was punished to a significantly lesser degree.
During the mandate of High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch, the peace mission fought
explicitly against these dominating ethno-nationalist parties. Petritsch criticized the ethno-
nationalists as poison for the country.54
In general, these efforts to weaken the ethno-nationalist parties delivered a partial suc-
cess. Table 1 presents how many votes SDS, HDZ, and SDA won within their own ethnic groups
in the elections to the House of Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, one chamber of the
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state parliament.55 The voters in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina vote for 28, those in
Republika Srpska for 14 seats of the House of Representatives. The cells for the Croat ethno-
nationalists (HDZ) and their Bosniac counterparts (SDA) are based on the results in the Federa-
tion; the cells for the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) refers to the polls in Republika Srpska.
1996 1998 2000 2002
HDZ 89 69 71 59
SDA 77 78 41 47
SDS 68 27 49 40
Table 1: Votes for HDZ, SDA, and SDS within their own ethnic group (in percent) in the
elections to the House of Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Table 1 shows that the three major ethno-nationalist parties continued to win a significant
share of the votes within their own ethnic groups. Nevertheless, compared to 1996, all of them
clearly lost support. In relative terms, the Croat HDZ was the strongest of them, since in every
election it won more than an absolute majority within its own ethnic group.56
Table 2 gives an overview of how many seats SDA, SDS, and HDZ won in the elections
to the House of Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Combined they received 36 of 42
mandates 1996, 27 in 1998, only 19 in 2000 and 20 in 2002.
1996 1998 2000 2002
HDZ 8 6 5 5
SDA 19 17 8 10
SDS 9 4 6 5
Together 36 27 19 20
Table 2: Seats won by SDS, SDA, and HDZ in the House of Representatives of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (42 seats)
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Minor radical ethno-nationalist parties only partly compensated for the losses of SDS,
HDZ, and SDA. More moderate ethnic parties, as such the Bosniac Party for Bosnia and Herze-
govina (SBiH), the (Serb) Party for Democratic Progress (PDP) or the New Croat Initiative
(NHI), emerged. The multiethnic Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the (Serb) Alliance of
Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), the main favorites of the peace mission, were by 2002
much stronger than in 1996.57
The SDS was the first of the major ethno-nationalist parties to lose governmental power.
After an intra-party conflict in 1997, extraordinary elections to Republika Srpska’s parliament
were held at the end of the same year. The SDS was deprived of its majority, and in January
1998 the social democrat Milorad Dodik, whose party SNSD had only two of 83 seats, became
the new Prime Minister. The peace mission was very active in organizing a majority of represen-
tatives for the decisive vote, including politicians of the SDA and a splinter of the SDS. Only
after the elections in 2000 did the SDS succeed in returning to the government of Republika
Srpska. However, it would have been possible in 2000 as well as in 2002 to form a majority
against the SDS and the even more ethno-nationalist Serb Radical Party (SRS). In 2006, this
option was realized as the SDS’ main ally, the Party of Democratic Progress (PDP), changed
sides. Milorad Dodik (SNSD) became Prime Minister again.58
In 2000, SDA and HDZ had to leave the governments at both the state level and the Fed-
eration. The Democratic Alliance for Change, a post-election coalition of ten parties led by the
Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH), came into
power. At the state level the Party of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), the Party of Demo-
cratic Progress (PDP) and other parties based in Republika Srpska supported the Alliance for
Change.59 The U.S. and British ambassadors in particular encouraged the participating parties to
build this alliance. In 2002, however, first and foremost due to losses of the Social Democratic
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Party, the HDZ and SDA re-entered the governments of the state and of the Federation. If
Samuel Huntington’s two-turnover test60 is a good indicator for consolidation of democracy,
Bosnia and Herzegovina belongs to the illustrious club of consolidated democracies.
High Representative Paddy Ashdown introduced a new strategy in dealing with the
ethno-nationalist parties. “I will support actions and reforms, not personalities or parties. It is up
to the people of BiH to choose their government,” he said.61 Nevertheless, his sanctions mainly
affected the SDS and HDZ.
The steady pressure on these political parties changed their form and character to a cer-
tain degree. After the defeat of the Alliance for Change in 2002, Jakob Finci, head of the Jewish
Community and a leading person in civil society initiatives in Sarajevo, stated that SDS, HDZ,
and SDA were not the same as they had been ten years before.62 By 2005, the wartime leader-
ship, particularly in SDS and HDZ, had largely been replaced. This happened through exclusion
or splits rooted in disagreement over how to deal with the peacebuilders. One prominent exam-
ple was Biljana Plavšić, then president of Republika Srpska, who was excluded from the SDS in
1997 and established the Serb People’s Alliance (SNS). Another spectacular case was Krešimir
Zubak, then Croat member of the state presidency, who left the HDZ in 1998 and established the
New Croat Initiative (NHI). Dismissals by the High Representative also changed the parties’
leadership. Ante Jelavić and Dragan Čović, both Croat member of the state presidency, were
removed in 2001 and 2005. In 1996, Karadžić, already indicted for war crimes, was pressured to
resign as President of Republika Srpska. In 1999, his successor Nikola Poplašen [Serb Radical
Party (SRS)] was sacked. In 2003, Ashdown ordered the removal of Mirko Šarović (SDS), the
Serb member of the state presidency. A side-effect of these removals was that SDS, HDZ, and
SDA in 2005 were clearly less leader-oriented or personalistic parties than the Social Democratic
Party (SDP) under Zlatko Lagumdžija and the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, which
is mentioned on ballots as “SNSD – Milorad Dodik.”
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Contributing to the change of the major ethno-nationalist parties, some leaders have been
or are currently on trial at the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY);
among them Biljana Plavšić; Momčilo Krajišnik, the closest associate of Radovan Karadžić; and
Jadranko Prlić, formerly HDZ and Prime Minister of the Croat para-state Herceg Bosna.
Borislav Bojić, president of the SDS club in the parliament of Republika Srpska, explained that
currently his party is dominated by a third generation, after the first and second one had been
dismissed or tried for war crimes.63
At least at the level of declarations, SDS, HDZ, and SDA have changed their programs.
Prior to the general elections in 2002, they assented to the reform agenda “Jobs and Justice”
agreed on by the governments of the state and entities and the Peace Implementation Council.64
Another indicator was a change toward war crimes committed by members of their own ethnic
group. In July 1997, Momčilo Krajišnik, then Serb member of the state presidency, and Dragan
Kalinić (both SDS), speaker of the parliament of Republika Srpska, attended the funeral of the
war criminal Simo Drljaća. Krajišnik said the peace forces had killed an innocent man.65 Seven
years later, however, Dragan Čavić (SDS), president of Republika Srpska, declared Srebrenica a
dark page in the Serb people’s history. In November 2004, the government of this entity con-
fessed to the massacre and its dimension and apologized for this war crime.66
Asked whether the three major ethno-nationalist parties have changed, Gojko Berić,
columnist for the daily Oslobođenje, said they remained the same. “The only difference is that
today they no longer use weapons but sit in the parliament wearing ties.”67 A similar answer was
given by Sejfudin Tokić, president of the Social Democratic Union (SDU): “They changed only
superficially. They no longer fight with weapons, but with politics. That is the tragedy of Bosnia
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and Herzegovina.”68 Both comments reveal a deep frustration. Unintendedly, however, they
describe exactly that transformation from the battlefield to the parliamentary plenum that post-
settlement peacebuilding is trying to achieve.
It would be misleading to assume that ethno-nationalism persists only due to the activi-
ties of SDS, HDZ, and SDA on the supply side of the political market. Of course, these political
parties nourish ethno-nationalist orientations within their ethnic group. Nevertheless, there is a
demand for such programs, which is independent from the parties’ campaigning. Moreover, not
only SDS, HDZ, and SDA propagate and maintain ethno-nationalist attitudes. The religious
communities in the area—the Islamic Community, the Serb Orthodox Church, and the Catholic
Church—are powerful players on the supply side of ethno-nationalism, too.69 The Catholic
Bishop Conference, for instance, has stated: “We understand the need for education reform in
accordance with European standards but we don’t understand and we don’t accept that reform as
the instrument for extermination of a new Croat generation.”70 By and large, the religious com-
munities are beyond the reach of the Bonn Powers.
5. Support for moderate parties
Prior to the elections in 1996, the peace mission had an impartial stance toward the vari-
ous political parties. The OSCE mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, for instance, gave money to
all registered parties, even when they were led by war criminals.71 SDS, HDZ, and SDA won
these elections and tried to maintain their authoritarian rule and undemocratic power structures.
SDS and HDZ obstructed the efforts to reintegrate the country and to establish functioning
common institutions. Reacting to this, the peace mission changed its approach before the local
elections in 1997 and provided funding only to opposition parties.
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The same year, the SDS split after the entity’s president, Biljana Plavšić, a notorious
ethno-nationalist, accused Radovan Karadžić and Momčilo Krajišnik of corruption and obstruc-
tionism that in her view endangered the existence of Republika Srpska. The peace mission open-
ly supported Plavšić and her more cooperative faction against their hard-line rivals. The resulting
conflict was solved through the extraordinary election in Republika Srpska. In 2003, however,
the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia sentenced Plavšić, the “moderate” of
1997, to eleven years imprisonment.
At the Peace Implementation Conference in Bonn in December 1997, in a move meant to
strengthen the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the peacebuilders announced support for multi-
ethnic political parties.72 Six months later, before the next general elections in autumn 1998, the
Peace Implementation Council appealed to political parties and other organizations in its mem-
ber states to support pro-Dayton and multi-ethnic parties.73
Roland Paris proposed to postpone elections in order to weaken radical parties and to
strengthen moderate ones. After the first elections in 1996, the peace mission in Bosnia and
Herzegovina tried to reach the same goal, but through a different approach: Bosnia and Herze-
govina became a world champion in elections. In 1996, 1998, and 2000, the state parliament was
elected for a mandate of two years.74 Only in the elections of 2002 was a four-year term intro-
duced. The peacebuilders hoped that at each election the support for the ruling nationalist party
would decline and multiethnic and moderate parties would win additional votes.
The peace mission succeeded in bringing moderate parties into power, but its support for
these groups resulted in some unintended side-effects. The government of Prime Minister Dodik
in Republika Srpska between 1998 and 2000, for instance, was notorious for corruption and nep-
otism and did not fulfill international expectations. Knowing that the peace mission perceived
him as moderate and preferred him to any SDS government, Dodik felt free to stick to intransi-
gent Serb demands. His reputation as the peace mission’s favorite induced him to uncompro-
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mising positions in order not to be regarded as its puppet.75 Even after Dodik had lost power in
2000, his party frequently tried to outbid the SDS on defending Serb interests and Republika
Srpska.
Arrogance, various scandals, and a loss of contact with the electorate contributed to the
defeat of the Alliance for Change in 2002.76 An employee of the OSCE mission concluded that
“so much obvious support was given to Lagumdžija and the SDP and all the parties that were
running the Alliance. It caused them to get so over-confident that we did not watch what they
were doing. It lowered the credibility of parties of that type and strengthened the ability of the
nationalist to come back.”77
The certainty of being the internationals’ favorites consolidated undemocratic attitudes.
Since his defeat, Lagumdžija, the leader of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), has frequently
blamed the High Representative for helping to or even bringing SDS, HDZ, and SDA back into
government.78 Indirectly but vehemently, he criticizes the High Representative for having ac-
cepted and implemented the election results that ruled out the possibility to build the state and
Federation government against all three major ethno-nationalist parties.
Despite all democracy assistance, various seminars for its members, funding and tech-
nical support, and cooperation with social democratic parties abroad the SDP does not score
better in internal democracy than other political parties. Sejfudin Tokić, until 2002 one of the ten
leading politicians within SDP, said that Lagumdžija alone decided on everything. Only during
the decisive parliament session was Tokić informed who was nominated as the party’s candidate
for the Secretary for the Treasury.79 At the SDP congress in February 2005, Nermin Pećanac ran
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against Lagumdžija for the position of the party’s president but lost the election. Some weeks
later, Lagumdžija dissolved the cantonal branch that supported Pećanac.80
Not only the peace mission’s favorites, but all relevant political parties are characterized
by a lack of intra-party democracy.81 The political parties had to submit democratic statutes;
otherwise the election commission could reject their participation in elections. These statutes,
however, obviously remain rather irrelevant for the inner life of the political parties. Neither the
OHR nor the election commission seemed to care about violations of intra-party democracy.
6. Experiments in integrative power-sharing
Roland Paris prefers an election system according to the ideas of integrative power-
sharing.82 Electoral procedures such as preferential voting or alternative voting will “make mod-
eration pay,” as Donald Horowitz put it.83 Candidates and political parties should depend on
votes from other ethnic groups so that they see an incentive to campaign on a more moderate
platform.
In 1997, the Peace Implementation Council asked the High Representative and the OSCE
mission to take due account of the need to support multiethnic parties when drafting a new elec-
tion law.84 Only in 2000 the did peace mission experiment with introducing integrative power-
sharing. In order to increase the chances of their favorite, Milorad Dodik (SNSD), it prescribed
preferential voting for electing the president of Republika Srpska.85 This voting system allowed
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one not only to mark one’s most favorite option but further preferences as well. The peace mis-
sion hoped that Dodik, as the more moderate of the both most promising candidates, would win
second preferences of Bosniac and Croat voters.
Candidate Party First
preferences
Mirko Šarović SDS – Serb Democratic Party 49.8%
Milorad Dodik SNSD – Party of Independent Social
Democrats
25.7%
Momčilo Telić PDP – Party of Democratic Progress 8.6%
Slobodan Popović SDP – Social Democratic Party 7.8%
Zijad Mujkić GDS – Civic Democratic Party 6.0%
Aljo Dugonjić BOSS – Bosnian Party 2.0%
Table 3: Presidential election in Republika Srpska 2000
The first preferences for Mirko Šarović (SDS) were almost sufficient to achieve the re-
quired 50% (see Table 3). The support for Milorad Dodik on the second rank was only half as
strong as Šarović’s one. The election officials struck the candidate with the smallest number of
first preferences, Aljo Dugonjić of the Bosniac BOSS (Bosnian Party), from the list, and distrib-
uted the further preferences of his voters to the remaining candidates. After this, Šarović, the
more radical candidate, got the required share of votes.86 Probably only Serb citizens gave their
first preferences to the candidates of SDS, SNSD, or PDP. Thus, one can estimate that at least
85% of the voters were Serbs. Looking at this number, Bosniac or Croat votes would only be
crucial in a close race between the two strongest Serb candidates. Otherwise, they make no dif-
ference, so there is no incentive to campaign for votes from members of other ethnic groups.
Obviously, this kind of integrative power-sharing can only function under certain ethno-struc-
tural conditions. Sumantra even assumed that the preferential voting system was counter-
productive because voters understood that this new procedure would support moderate candi-
dates and weaken the ethno-nationalist ones. Reacting to this, they closed ranks behind the
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SDS.87 Moreover, in contrast to the aim of integrative power-sharing, the pre-election campaign
concentrated on ethno-nationalist issues.
A second experiment in integrative power-sharing also took place prior to the elections in
2000. The Provisional Election Commission, dominated by the OSCE mission, introduced new
rules for delegating Croat representatives in the House of Peoples in the Federation. Until then,
the members of the Cantonal Assemblies could vote only for delegates from their own ethnic
group. Therefore, the ethno-nationalist Croat Democratic Community (HDZ) had controlled the
selection of almost all Croat delegates to the House of Peoples. According to the new rules, all
members of the Cantonal Assemblies could decide on the complete candidate list for the House
of Peoples. Consequently, Bosniacs, and “Others” as well would elect the Croat delegates, so
that Croat candidates depended on support by non-Croat representatives.88 The Provisional Elec-
tion Commission intended to set incentives for a more moderate behavior. The new voting pro-
cedure, however, undermined the Croat veto right in the Federation as well as at the state level89
and hardened the already flame-raking pre-election campaign of the HDZ. Ante Jelavić, member
of the state presidency and president of the HDZ, declared the Federation to be dead.90 His party
and other Croat ethno-nationalists established a parallel parliament that demanded separate Croat
institutions throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.91 For the election day, they organized a referen-
dum on a separate entity for the Croats. Moreover, the HDZ placarded “determination or exter-
mination.”92 The attempt to introduce integrative power-sharing did not reduce, but rather
heightened the tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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7. Control of hate speech
The sixth element of Paris’ concept of “institutionalization before liberalization” recom-
mends punishing hate speech media and supporting alternative newspapers, radio or TV sta-
tions.93
According to a former member of the OHR, the peace mission regarded the media situa-
tion as an important obstacle to peacebuilding and tried to reduce the ethno-nationalist parties’
influence over the media as far as possible.94 Even before establishing the semi-protectorate, the
peace mission supported and established alternative media and fought against radical radio and
TV stations. In total, the peace mission invested about US$100 million in media development.95
In 1998, the High Representative established the Independent Media Commission, which
developed a code of conduct and distributed licenses to TV and radio stations. According to the
code of conduct, the media had to report in a fair and precise manner that did not inflame hatred
against other ethnic groups or religions. In the case of non-compliance with its regulations, the
Independent Media Commission as well as its successor organizations were entitled to demand
public apologies, to impose fees, to suspend and annul the license, and even to seize equip-
ment.96 Although it had a broader mandate, the Independent Media Commission concentrated on
supervising only the electronic media. The press regulated itself through a Press Council that did
not possess the power to enforce sanctions.97
These efforts to restructure the electronic media were a success. The ethno-nationalist
parties lost their dominance over radio and TV stations. In a ranking by the Reporters without
Frontiers on freedom of the media in 2005, Bosnia and Herzegovina was better placed than the
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United States.98 The reporting of these media changed dramatically. Even critical observers
certified that in 2005 the big electronic media presented a program that was much fairer and
more balanced than eight or ten years before.99 Hate speech and radical propaganda have been
contained. In June 2005, even Serb TV stations broadcast a video showing the execution of
Bosniac boys and men by Serb militias. This seemed to be impossible some years earlier.100 The
press working under self-regulation, however, was characterized by frequent “press wars” and
dirty campaigning.101
While the Independent Media Commission could punish hate speech in the media, the
Election Commission possessed the mandate to sanction political parties for inflammatory state-
ments. For instance, four days before the election in 2000, the HDZ was forbidden to use the slo-
gan “determination or extermination.”102 Just as hate speech has been contained in the electronic
media, political parties have more and more refrained from inflammatory statements.
8. The state of democracy and self-sustaining peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Roland Paris’ concept of “institutionalization before liberalization” and the peace mis-
sion in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1997 onwards shared the goal of containing the potential
perils of post-war democratization. Nevertheless, the peace mission did not implement all of
Paris’ recommendations. As Table 4 sums up, the peacebuilders took to heart three proposals
(weaken radical actors, support moderate ones, control hate speech) completely or to a large
extent. The semi-protectorate was at least a partly implementation of the advice to install an
international administration. In accord with Paris, the peace mission tested elements of integra-
tive power-sharing in 2000. Proportional voting, however, was predominant. The only recom-
mendation by Paris the peace mission ignored was to avoid early elections.
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Institutionalization
before liberalization
The peace mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Postpone elections until
opinion polls show that
moderate parties are
stronger than radical ones.
Early elections not avoided, first post-war elections in September
1996. Later frequent elections and support for multiethnic and
moderate parties as compensation.
Electoral system that
makes moderation pay
(integrative power-
sharing).
In general proportional vote. 2000 experiments in integrative
power-sharing (preferential vote for the presidency of Republika
Srpska, new procedure for electing delegates of the Federation’s
House of Peoples), Both experiments increased tensions.
International
administration.
Since December 1997 semi-protectorate, High Representative
can dismiss politicians and impose laws.
Peacebuilders weaken
radical actors.
Since 1997 attacks on the illegal power structures of SDS, HDZ,
and SDA. Reform of police, armed forces, secret services,
judiciary, media, civil service, and payment system. Dismissals
and financial sanctions.
Peacebuilders support
moderate actors.
Since 1997 preferential treatment during pre-election campaigns.
Frequent elections and proportional vote with low thresholds.
Coalition-building. Interventions in conflicts on the side of the
more moderate actors.
Control of hate speech. Election commission sanctioned political parties and individual
politicians. Media commissions reduced inflammatory speech in
electronic media, but Press Council less effective.
Table 4: Implementation of the concept “institutionalization before liberalization” in Bosnia and
Herzegovina
The previous sections have revealed successes and problems of the respective tools of
peacebuilding through democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The concluding paragraphs
will discuss how far democratization and creating a self-sustaining peace have been progressed
until 2005/2006.
Without being a democracy Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2005/2006 is much more demo-
cratic than it was seven or ten years before. The illegal and undemocratic power structures of
SDS, HDZ, and SDA have been drastically reduced. The ethno-nationalists have lost their dom-
inant role in the media sector, and hate speech has been contained, particularly on radio and tele-
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vision. The police still do not function according to the criteria of the rule of law and the separa-
tion of power. However, police forces no longer belong to the main perpetrators of attacks on
minorities or opposition groups.103 Freedom of movement has been improved dramatically.
People can freely establish political parties or other organizations. The pre-electoral campaigns
in 2002 and 2004 (local elections) took place in a less violent atmosphere than in 1996 or 1998.
As Davor Vuletić, member of the SDP main board, said, in 1996 SDP activists even in relatively
tolerant Sarajevo only dared to paste posters in small and armed groups.104 In 2002, however, the
political parties did not complain of a violent atmosphere during the pre-election campaign. At
the state and entity level two peaceful turnovers of power have taken place after elections.
Despite all change for the better, Bosnia and Herzegovina 2005/2006 cannot be classified
as democracy. Democracy implies self-determination; Bosnia and Herzegovina has to be char-
acterized as a semi-protectorate in which elected parliaments and governments were subordi-
nated to the High Representative.
At the end of 2005, peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina was neither a full failure
nor successfully completed. On one hand, a relapse into war could be prevented. On the other
hand, the peace mission has not departed, thereby making it impossible to detect a self-sustain-
ing peace. Notwithstanding, one can approximate the degree of conflict transformation by
analyzing changes in the object of the conflict, in dealing with the conflict, and in the conflicting
parties.
In 2005/2006, political conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina still concentrated on the ques-
tion of how the state should be organized. This struggle, however, has shifted more and more
from arenas outside the Dayton structures to its common institutions. Many Serbs and Croats
still preferred secession or unification with Croatia or Serbia, but they recognized increasingly
that there was no realistic alternative to the common state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Although reliable and precise data are not available, it would be correct to say that politi-
cally motivated violence has declined. This development is reflected in the reports of the Hel-
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107 Bakšić 1996, p. 18.
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sinki Committee for Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina.105 Their focus has shifted from
violations of basic rights to precarious social rights or rights of vulnerable groups.106 The last
major outbreak of politically motivated violence happened in May 2001 when Serb extremists
prevented the reconstruction of mosques. Then, the peace mission had to urge Serb politicians to
condemn the violence. After minor incidents in the following years, however, Serb leaders con-
demned violent actions without such a request.
Another indicator of a more stable situation is that the citizens have more confidence that
peace will last, if the peacekeeping forces leave. According to opinion polls by the University of
Sarajevo in April 1996, more than half of the citizens believed that a new war would break out
without the Implementation Force.107 Reports by the Early Warning System of the United Na-
tions Development Programme (UNDP) in Bosnia and Herzegovina reveal that this fear declined
over time in areas with a Bosniac or Croat majority.108 In May 2000, 48% in predominant Bos-
niac areas worried about a new war without the peacekeeping forces; at the end of 2002 it was
still 39%, but in December 2005 only 19%. In Croat areas, 33% believed in a new war in May
2000, 18% at the end of 2002, and 15% in December 2005. In regions with a Serb majority the
fear was lowest in the second half of 2004, but almost reached its initial value of 2000 at the end
of 2005.
The former warring parties did not disappear into new groups that were not defined eth-
nically. The conflict among Bosniacs, Serbs, and Croats has remained dominant, but has been
reduced in its polarizing effect. A drastically decreased voter turn-out showed frustration and
apathy, but, as well, a decline of the ethnic conflict in its power to mobilize. The pressure on the
ethnic groups to secure internal cohesion was lessened, which was indicated by a very frag-
mented party system and electoral defeats of SDS, HDZ, and SDA. These three protagonists of
wartime no longer acted with weapons, but sat in the parliaments wearing ties, as Gojko Berić
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said. The leaderships of SDS, HDZ, and SDA were replaced, due to the dismissals by the High
Representative. Programmatic changes of these parties were demonstrated by an increased
acceptance of the common state as well by the stated goal that Bosnia and Herzegovina should
join the European Union.
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